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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Unanswered is the question whether the electorate or the legislature
could constitutionally simply repeal the sanctions on private property
owners imposed by the Rumford Act. Such action would appear to
be directed only at changing a particular method of executing the
state's policy against discrimination in housing, rather than at re-
versing the policy itself. Moreover, since the legislature could at any
time reenact those sanctions or enact new laws relating to the dis-
criminatory conduct of private property owners, the repeal of the
Rumford Act would not result in the serious restrictions on the state's
ability to deal with this problem which resulted from the adoption of
Proposition 14. Nevertheless, even the mere legislative repeal of those
sanctions against private property owners might be invalidated if the
court believed that the lack of such sanctions thereby nullified the
state's entire policy against discrimination in housing.
'PUBLIC PURPOSE" IN MUNICIPAL
FINANCING PLANS
The City Commission of Deerfield Beach authorized issuance of
municipal bonds pledged by certain excise taxes to purchase land on
which a major league baseball training facility was to be built and
maintained by the city. The facility was to be leased to and operated
by a private corporation. Rental, payable to the city, was to be the
annual debt service on the bonds plus fifty per cent of net profits in
excess of prior years' losses. Validation of the proposed issuance was
decreed by the circuit court. On a taxpayer's appeal, the Florida
Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, reversed. Held: A bond
issuance proposed by a municipality, whereby the municipality agreed
to purchase land on which to build and maintain a baseball training
facility for subsequent lease to a private corporation, violates state
constitutional provisions prohibiting assessment of taxes1 and exten-
sion of credit2 for purposes which are not "public." 3 Brandes v. City
1 FLA. CONST. art. 9, § 5 provides:
The Legislature shall authorize the several counties and incorporated cities or
towns in the State to assess and impose taxes for county and municipal purposes,
and for no other purposes, and all property shall be taxed upon the principles
established for State taxation.
2 FLA. CoNsT. art. 9, § 10 provides:
The Legislature shall not authorize any county, city, borough, township or
incorporated district to become a stockholder in any company, association or
corporation, or to obtain or appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any
corporation, association, institution or individual.8 Numerous state constitutions prohibit taxation except for public purposes. See
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of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1966).
Judicial conceptions of what constitutes a "public purpose" within
constitutional provisions prohibiting expenditures for any other pur-
pose have varied significantly.4 Changes in time, place and the pre-
vailing economic and social conditions have resulted in new public
requirements. These new requirements have impelled a re-examination
of the public purpose doctrine by some state legislatures and courts to
permit flexible municipal response to local problems.' The principal
case, however, illustrates how a complex municipal project which the
officials of a municipality have decided would serve a public purpose
can be invalidated without articulation of the criteria relied upon and
without a close, impartial scrutiny into the project's effect on the com-
munity and the state.
Numerous provisions from the lease contract between the City of
Deerfield Beach and its lessee, Deerstad, Inc., were quoted by the
majority in the principal case. These provisions recited the city's
obligations under the lease contract of site purchase and construction
and maintenance of the proposed baseball facility. At this point the
court abruptly concluded: "It seems clear that purpose of the pro-
posed bond issue is not for a public purpose or municipal purpose, and
furthermore that the City, by the proposed services to be rendered by
it, is lending its credit in contravention to the provisions of ... the
McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 137, 138 n.2 (1929).
Provisions prohibiting extension of public credit to private enterprises are also
prevalent in state constitutions. See Note, Legal Limitations on Public Inducements
to Industrial Location, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 618, 621 (1959) ; Abbey, Municipal Indus-
trial Development Bonds, 19 VAMW. L. Rsv. 25, 37 (1965). Washington's constitution
limits municipalities to taxation for municipal purposes and prohibits lending
public credit to individuals or private corporations. See WASH. CoNsT. art. 8, § 7;
art. 11, § 12.
'The "public purpose" doctrine has proven to be an extremely flexible concept.
A decision as to whether a certain project serves a "public purpose" is usually
determined by the problems and needs in the deciding court's jurisdiction and by
the attitude of the court as to how these problems and needs can best be met. When
proposed projects are challenged as violating "public purpose" provisions of the
state constitution, courts have not elucidated the distinction betveen purposes
"public" and "private." See generally 15 McQumLimr, MuNIcr'AL CoaroArIoNs
§ 43.31 (3d ed. 1950) ; McCallister, supra note 3, at 145; Note, The "Public Purpose"
of Municipal Financing for Industrial Developnent, 70 YALE L.J. 789, 795 (1961);
Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 109 (1959).
'This re-examination is illustrated by the efforts of several southern state
legislatures to solve unemployment problems by permitting municipalities to finance
industrial development through bonding. A forerunner of the procedure of industrial
development through municipal bonding was the Mississippi Balance Agriculture
With Industry plan (BAWl) passed in 1936. MIss. CODE ANN. § 8936-05 (Supp.
1964) provides: "(c) That the present and prospective ... general welfare of the
citizens demand as a public purpose the development within Mississippi of com-
mercial ... enterprises .... " See generally Note, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal
Financing for Industrial Development, 70 YALE L.J. 789 (1961).
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Constitution."6 The Chief Justice, speaking for the dissent, concluded
that building such a baseball facility was a "legitimate public objec-
tive"; therefore, there was nothing constitutionally objectionable in a
governmental agency and a private corporation joining forces to fur-
ther this public objective. Furthermore, the Chief Justice argued that
the decision concerning whether the project would serve the welfare of
the community should be left to the officials of that community, pre-
sumably because these officials are in a better position than a court to
assess the impact of the proposed facility on the community.7
Underlying both constitutional provisions relied upon by the ma-
jority is the conception that the public must be the primary beneficiary
of any proposal requiring the expenditure of public monies., The tax
provision, permitting the legislature to authorize taxation by incor-
porated cities for municipal purposes only, represents an accepted
axiom of taxation: tax monies must be used to confer benefit on the
taxpayers generally, not a private group or individual.9 Extension of
public credit to a private organization or individual is prohibited to
prevent municipalities from becoming involved in private projects
which in the past have proven to be financially disastrous for some
communities." °
Courts have recognized that a determination of whether a public
purpose will be served by a proposal is essentially a matter for the
legislature,"I and a legislative determination is not likely to be over-
turned by a court unless it is clearly arbitrary or, as stated in a pre-
vious Florida decision, it violates "organic law."' 2 However, plans
186 So. 2d at 12.
TId. at 12, 13.
Id. at 12:
"Taxes for municipal purposes" means a public purpose as distinguished from
a private or nongovernmental purpose .... The mere incidental advantage to the
public resulting from a public aid in the promotion of private enterprise is not
a public or municipal purpose; and the incidental benefits or advantages gained
by private enterprise from expenditures made for a public purpose do not
vitiate or diminish the public purpose.
This form of analysis affords a court much leeway in assessing the public purpose
in a project. See McAllister, supra note 3, at 145: "When the court sets up the
category of direct and substantial or indirect and incidental public benefits the final
decision will depend on the judgment of the court as to which social values shall
prevail."
'See ANDERSON, TAXATION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 21-25 (1951); Mc-
Allister, supra note 3, at 140.
"Bailey v. City of Tampa, 92 Fla. 1030, 111 So. 119 (1926). See generally Note
Legal Limitations on Public Inducements to Industrial Location, 59 COLUM. L. REV.
618 (1959).
1 Peterson v. Town of Davenport, 90 Fla. 71, 105 So. 265 (1925) ; Brown v. Lake-
land, 61 Fla. 508, 54 So. 716 (1911). See 16 McQuiLLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 44.35 (3d ed. rev. 1963).
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conceived at the municipal level without legislative approval do not
enjoy the same presumption of validity as do plans authorized by the
state legislature. 3
The proposal in the principal case did not receive state legislative
approval. Furthermore, the financing plan was advanced by the city
officials without the benefit of state legislative standards or guidelines
which would permit the municipality to coordinate the bond proposal
with the economic and recreational goals of the state. 4 Also, there is
no procedure for submitting a proposal to a state administrative agency
that could consider the plan according to specific legislative criteria
and thus assure closer correlation with the legislature's understanding
of what is a public purpose and a legitimate public objective. The
problem is how to permit municipalities to plan community develop-
ments with some confidence that the project satisfies current legislative
understanding of what serves a public purpose and thereby minimize
"'In Peterson v. Town of Davenport, 90 Fla. 71, 74, 105 So. 265, 266 (1925), the
court observed:
Whether the object for which bonds are to be used is a municipal purpose may
not be arbitrarily determined by legislation without regard to organic limita-
tions; but a statutory determination of what is an appropriate municipal pur-
pose will not be disturbed by the courts, where the purpose designated by statute
is in fact municipal in its nature, and no provision of organic law is violated
in such designation.
The term "organic law" usually refers to constitutional law only. See St. Louis v.
Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 469, 46 S.W. 976, 979 (1898). See also Patterson, Legal Aspects
of Florida Municipal Bond Financing, 6 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 287, 311 (1953) ; 15
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4329 (3d ed. 1950).
"The difference between a municipally proposed plan with state legislative
approval and a plan without such approval with respect to presumptive validity is
illustrated by two Florida Supreme Court decisions. In City of Bradenton v. State,
88 Fla. 381, 102 So. 556 (1924), the court held a municipally proposed bond issuance
for construction of a golf course unconstitutional because it was a corporate and not
a governmental function. In Peterson v. Town of Davenport, supra note 12, a similar
bond issue for golf course construction was validated by the court when the state
legislature expressly authorized the city to issue the bonds.
'
4 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 169.02 (1941) provides: "The city or town council may
issued [sic] bonds ... whenever it may be necessary for the purpose of building or
repairing the public works of the city, the widening and extension of streets or
parks, payment of existing indebtedness of the city, or any other municipal purpose."
This enabling act provides no concrete guidance for a municipality concerning the
specific economic or recreational goals of the state.
That the state legislature has recognized the importance of economic and recrea-
tional development is indicated by the powers granted to the Florida Development
Commission. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 288.03 (1955) provides:
The general purposes of the commission shall be to guide, stimulate and
promote the ... development of the state ... counties and municipalities ....
For the accomplishment of such purposes, the commission shall have the
power and authority to: (1) Create and build Florida industries ... encourage
visitors from other states and countries to come to Florida, and raise the earning
level of Florida's citizens; and in order to promote and develop business ... to
plan and conduct a campaign of information, advertising and publicity relating




the possibility of summary judicial invalidation. This problem is com-
plicated by the almost limitless factors which could be considered in
determining whether the public would be the primary beneficiary of a
bond proposal. The summary disposition of the public purpose issue
by both opinions in the principal case could be attributed to the court's
realization that it did not possess the background or expertise to fully
consider the economic and social complexities of the question."
A possible solution to the problem is found in the response of the
Tennessee legislature to serious conditions of unemployment, emigra-
tion and sub-average family incomes. The legislature passed "The
Industrial Building Bond Act of 1955,"" which, after enunciating
the conditions needing reform, stipulated that it was in the public
interest to solve these problems through municipal industrial bonding.1"
Very specific statutory standards had to be met before a municipally
proposed financing plan would be approved by the state administrative
agency which had authority to grant or withhold a "Certificate of
Public Purpose and Necessity" enabling the municipality to go ahead
with the project. 8 The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the act
was constitutional because solving unemployment and low income
crises through issuance of general obligation bonds for industrial de-
velopment involved pledging of the taxing power for a public purpose."
The procedure set up for industrial financing in Tennessee provides
for legislative articulation of the purposes which the financing seeks to
" The tendency of courts to avoid detailed analysis of the public purpose ques-
tion could also be attributed to a conviction that another government body, because
of expert background and available research assistance, would better assess the
ramifications of the issue. Therefore, the legislature or an administrative agency
should consider the question. See Note, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal Finan-
cing for Industrial Developtment, 70 YALE L.J. 789, 795-97 (1961).
'6TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2901 to -2916 (Supp. 1966).
"Compiler's Note to TENN. CoDE ANN. § 6-2902 (Supp. 1966). Acts 1955, ch. 209,
§ 1 provided:
That it is hereby determined and declared that the purpose of this Act is to do
that which the state welfare demands, and the state public policy requires:
(a) That the migration and loss of the people of Tennessee . . . be retarded and
reduced.
(b)) That the conditions of unemployment existing statewide in Tennessee be
relieved....
(g) That the present and prospective • . . general welfare of the citizens demani
as a public purpose, the development within Tennessee of commercial ...
enterprises by the several municipalities....
'
8 Standards which have to be met before a Certificate of Public Purpose and
Necessity will be issued are listed in TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2906 (Supp. 1966). The
agency has to determine that there exists (1) sufficient natural resources readily
available; (2) an available labor supply; (3) adequate property values to support
the bonded indebtedness.
'I McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn. 498, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1955). See Note,
Financing Industrial Development in the South, 14 VAND. L. R-v. 621, 626 (1961).
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accomplish and the criteria which must be met before a municipality
may issue its general obligation bonds. Passage of legislation pro-
viding for such a procedure would permit a municipality to plan finan-
cing projects according to specific standards promulgated by the state
legislature. For example, where development of recreational facilities
is an important aspect of a state's economy, a legislature could declare
that municipal development of such facilities would serve a "public
purpose." Limitations on the type of facilities and on the methods of
financing would provide additional guidance to a municipality which
would also consider the plan in light of the designated standards and
policies. 0 While judicial scrutiny would still be the final step, such a
procedure as suggested would provide a sounder basis for application
of the public purpose doctrine and minimize the prospect of summary
invalidation of municipal financing proposals.
VISITOR RESPONDING TO PUBLIC INVITATION
CLASSIFIED AS INVITEE
Defendant savings and loan association invited local community
groups to use, without charge, a room and adjoining kitchen facilities
on its premises for meetings. Plaintiff was injured on defendant's
premises while walking to a meeting of her organization scheduled for
this room. Plaintiff sued for damages; defendant's motion to dismiss
was granted. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the
order of dismissal and remanded. Held: When the public is invited
to use premises under circumstances implying an assurance of rea-
sonable care, any visitor responding to that invitation is an "invitee"
owed an affirmative duty of reasonable care by the owner or occupier,
whether or not economic benefit may be derived from the visit. Mc-
Kinnon v. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 68 Wash. Dec. 2d 640,
414 P.2d 773 (1966).
During the nineteenth century the common law evolved the cate-
gories of trespasser, licensee, and invitee for persons going on land of
another.' In Washington a land owner or occupier owes an invitee an
'A similar recommendation was made by a commentator on the limitations on
municipal indebtedness in Utah. Elimination of all restrictions on municipal
indebtedness present in the state constitution was advocated, followed by creation by
the legislature of a State Department of Local Government. This department would
have broad powers over financing plans of municipal corporations. See Note,
Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal Indebtedness, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 462, 487.
'See Comment, 10 ALA. L. REv. 369, 371-76 (1958); Annot, 95 A.L.R2d 992,
995-96 (1964).
